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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Navy has established a program of mid-career, professional, graduate education at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in order to meet its needs for a technically qualified, intellectually equipped officer 
corps. In addition, the graduate education program provides an opportunity for the Navy to transition 
officers from one set of skills developed in their undergraduate education to another that meets the Navy's 
current needs. Another benefit is the expertise in military-relevant topics that has developed in the faculty 
and students, leading to a vigorous graduate-education research program in support of the Navy and the 
Department of Defense. 
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) recently published its assessment of the Navy's flagship 
educational institutions, including the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The report found the quality of 
the NPS program to be high. In assessing the level of funding required to maintain the excellence of the 
Navy's flagship institutions, CNA explored the costs of using civilian-sector universities to obtain the 
same product. Two such approaches would be to send officers to civilian universities to obtain graduate 
education or to contract with a civilian university to operate NPS. 
CNA found the program costs at NPS to be much higher than the tuition costs at 28 other 
universities referenced in the study. However, we feel that the CNA study contains two crucial flaws that 
bias the comparison against NPS. First, in comparing costs between NPS and civilian alternatives, CNA 
fails to hold the desired outputs constant. Second, for both NPS and civilian institutions, CNA gives an 
incomplete measure of costs. Our analysis shows that the major factors of cost are the officer salaries and 
housing costs and, hence, the program duration. Additional significant cost factors are the year-round 
operation of NPS and the higher student contact-hour loads at NPS. 
Incorporating the salary and housing costs in this study, we find that NPS is the 8th least 
expensive of the 29 universities considered by CNA. Computing the cost per class hour (including the 
officers' salaries and housing), NPS is the least expensive of the alternatives. 
The existence of NPS is due to the benefits that NPS offers to the professional and technical 
development of the officer corps. Among these benefits are: 
(1) military, technical relevance of courses, theses, and curriculum content 
(2) specialized educational laboratory facilities devoted to military hardware and computer 
systems 
(3) officers and faculty with military expertise who produce analyses and research products that 
benefit the Navy and DoD 
(4) an admissions system with primary emphasis on military performance and secondary 
emphasis on academic performance 
(5) refresher and transition mechanisms that efficiently and effectively meet the need to allow 
for a time delay between undergraduate and graduate studies and for the assignment of 
officers to curricula that meet current Navy personnel requirements 
(6) an instructional tempo that operates year-round and allows higher-than-average course loads 
(7) military infrastructure that allows the officers to remain in a professional military 
environment while at school, including opportunities for interaction with officers from other 
services and countries. 
Comparing tuition at civilian universities to the NPS program cost (per year per student), NPS is 
most expensive of the 29 universities included in CNA's study. However, such a comparison is flawed 
since tuition costs alone do not measure the complete costs of providing graduate education to a military 
officer in the civilian sector. The following factors are necessary components of a complete cost- 
effectiveness analysis: 
(1) The officer-student's salary, benefits, and housing allowance should be considered. These 
costs exceed any tuition payments and are very sensitive to the cost of housing and the length 
of programs. NPS has existing base housing, which is less expensive than housing in the 
civilian sector. In addition, the average NPS masters program is 1.2 months shorter than the 
average masters program taken by Navy URL officers enrolled in civilian universities. 
(2) The role and cost of transition and refresher courses also must be incorporated into the 
analysis. These courses support the Navy's policy decisions to provide mid-career education 
to its officers and to transition officers into areas of expertise to meet Navy needs. 
(3) The higher contact-hour load carried by the officers receiving graduate education at NPS 
should also be added to the analysis. NPS officers attend approximately 768 hours of 
instruction annually, compared with approximately 486 hours per year at a civilian school. 
(4) Graduate courses are more expensive to offer than undergraduate courses, especially in the 
technical areas favored by the Navy. While it is difficult to separate graduate costs in the 
overall cost data from most civilian universities, a trend-line analysis indicates that the cost 
per graduate-course hour at NPS is much lower than the same cost for any civilian university. 
If a civilian school were to take over the management of NPS, therefore, there is no basis for 
believing that it could manage NPS more cost-effectively than the Navy is doing now. 
Including these factors in the cost analysis enables a more accurate comparison of NPS against 
civilian alternatives. Our cost comparison shows that the special benefits of NPS education come at little 
extra cost. Specifically, we conclude that 
(1) Measured by the cost per graduate, NPS is the 8th least expensive of the 29 universities 
considered by CNA. 
(2) Measured by the cost per class hour, NPS is the least expensive of the 29 universities. 
(3) The Navy is unlikely to reduce its graduate education costs by transferring NPS 
operational control to a civilian institution, unless that institution is willing to subsidize 
DoN students through its endowment or state tax funding. 
(4) Since the overall costs of graduate education are dominated by officers' salaries and 
housing costs, our analysis shows that the total costs are about the same, regardless of 
the provider. Hence, any policy decisions made on graduate education should be made 
on the basis of benefits to the Navy, in addition to costs. 
The CNA report also criticizes the relatively low rate of using NPS graduates in subsequent 
assignments in corresponding P-coded subspecialty billets. But CNA's solution, consolidation of 
subspecialties and curricula, is not based on any cost-benefit analysis, as CNA admits in its report. For 
some restricted-line and other Navy communities, NPS programs are highly successful in providing 
officers with the desired skills and utilization rates are high. In these communities, the subspecialty 
system is working properly and is efficiently coupled to the NPS graduate education system. For some 
other communities (notably the URL warfare communities at sea) the P-code system is not applicable and 
does not measure the contributions of graduate education to the performance of the officers. Even without 
a complete assessment of the value of graduate education, those communities with nominally low P-code 
utilization are benefiting from the analytic reasoning skills, military-technical familiarization, and other 
products of NPS graduate education. The P-code utilization rate does not measure these benefits and was 
never expected to do so. At-sea billets, for example, are rarely P-coded and, yet, officers in these billets 
do use their graduate education skills. In summary, the benefits of NPS graduate education extend beyond 
the subspecialty system. The challenge for the Navy and for NPS is to identify these benefits and 
incorporate an assessment system that will feed the emerging culture of Navy graduate education. 

The NPS Faculty Critique of 
CNA's A Bottom-Up Assessment 
of Navy Flagship Schools 
This is a response prepared by a committee of the NPS faculty to the report A Bottom-Up 
Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools by Linda C. Cavalluzzo and Donald J. Cymrot, Center for Naval 
Analyses Report CRM 97-24, January 1998. This response was endorsed by the faculty of the Naval 
Postgraduate School on 2 June 1998. 
Review of CNA Report Findings and Recommendations 
The CNA report documented the quality of education at the Navy's flagship schools including the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Using a variety of criteria, the report made the following findings in 
regard to NPS: 
• the masters-level program quality is high, 
• the labs are excellent (although a maintenance funding issue was identified as a potential 
problem) 
• the programs are approximately 23 months long with refresher and transition activities accounting 
for 21% ofthat total, 
• the curricula have a highly specific content as a result of meeting the needs of the P-code 
subspecialty system 
• there is a low utilization rate (approximately 37%) of graduates in P-coded billets. There is liberal 
substitution of related P-codes in filling billets. 
• NPS has the highest per-student expenditure relative to other "top-level" schools offering 
graduate-level technical education. 
CNA then went on to make the following recommendations1 relative to NPS and graduate 
education: 
• Navy leadership should reassess its system of graduate and professional military education and 
"...in particular the missions of the schools and curricula that fulfill those missions should be 
reevaluated and better tailored to meet Navy needs.."2 rather than relying on a subspecialty 
system focused on shore billets that has poor utilization. 
Navy leadership should consider a curriculum that "...might substitute some technical education 
with military education. This could take the form of a 'Masters of Science in Military 
Management and Technology.' Such a degree could include a military core that might cover 
1
 CNA, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," pp. 2-10 and 73-75 
2
 CNA, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," p. 5 
strategy and operations, and one of several technical tracks that would correspond with the broad 
technical areas of study that currently form the basis of the subspecialty education."3 
• Since current utilization rates and substitution patterns suggest that the curricula are 
overspecified, reduce the level of detail in curricula to allow combination of curricula and to 
allow competition with civilian schools to offer the resulting streamlined curricula. 
• Reduce the time on campus by 
- reducing program lengths through pruning of material, 
- offering refresher courses via distance learning methods, 
- offering provisional acceptances to officers requiring transition to new disciplines (i.e., require 
officers to complete transition courses before arriving at NPS), and 
- when possible, assigning graduates of USNA directly to NPS. 
• Explore the possibility of "...combining NPS and AFIT into a single school at NPS, with the 
Navy as executive agent."4 
• Consider "fencing" funding within a fiscal year to avoid funding instabilities 
• Explore the concept of asking for legislative relief to allow the establishment of endowments. 
In our continuing self-evaluation process, NPS had already identified some of these issues and 
had begun working on them. Initiatives were underway in such areas as 
• reducing program length by paring material, 
• combining  six  curricula into  a common  Information  Sciences,   Systems,  and  Operations 
curriculum, 
• preparing a curriculum focused on warfare for the warrior (designed to be of special interest to 
URL officers), 
• developing asynchronous and synchronous distance learning courses, and 
• incorporating Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) acquisition course material into appropriate programs. 
Our main criticism of the report is the lack of consideration given to the unique benefits of NPS, 
which make this institution difficult to compare to a civilian university. In addition, we feel that the cost 
analysis did not incorporate the full spectrum of factors. The following is our assessment of the CNA 
report. 
While NPS may (or may not) appear to be more expensive than civilian alternatives (and our cost 
analysis shows that NPS is not more expensive), the fundamental question in assessing NPS is whether 
the costs are justified by the benefits that NPS provides. The following are relevant special features of 
NPS, which the CNA report ignored in its analysis of NPS and civilian alternatives. 
3
 CNA, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," p. 5 
4
 CNA, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," p. 9 
Educational Issues 
There are several features of NPS that make it different from any other civilian graduate school. 
These differences are in direct response to Navy needs. The following is a listing of the most important of 
these benefits. 
1. Military Relevance of Education: NPS courses and theses are designed to be militarily relevant. The 
military relevance of NPS education is the primary reason for the existence of NPS. Many courses are 
devoted entirely to specialized military topics not available at civilian universities. Some courses at 
NPS are classified, an option that is not allowed on most civilian-school campuses. Even courses that 
appear to have counterparts at other universities are taught at NPS with military relevance through the 
examples and applications. 
NPS curricula are designed to meet the needs of the military communities who sponsor the curricula. 
NPS is capable of responding rapidly to changing sponsor needs, such as increased technical content 
in the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) curricula or the developing curriculum in 
information technology for the warrior. Civilian universities would not give the Navy the same degree 
of influence over curriculum design and content. 
2. Special Laboratories and Officer Experience Tours: NPS's specialized laboratories and facilities 
provide educational benefits to our officers that would not be available at civilian universities without 
recreating the facilities there. These include: 
(1) Radar/Electronic Warfare Laboratory (containing classified, military systems) 
(2) FLTSATCOM satellite telemetry, command system and spacecraft simulator 
(3) Point Sur SOSUS underwater acoustic array 
(4) Secure Systems Technology Laboratory with CINC-level Global Command and Control 
System (GCCS) suite and Global Broadcast System (GBS) Receiver 
(5) Shipboard Power Systems Laboratory 
(6) SCI-classified Signals Processing and Space Systems Laboratory 
(7) Fleet Numerical Meteorological and Oceanic Center, the Navy's center for world-wide 
weather prediction (a tenant activity of NPS) 
(8) CIRPAS, an interdisciplinary facility for testing unmanned airborne vehicle (UAV) flight 
parameters, atmospheric soundings from UAVs and electromagnetic sensors on UAVs 
(9) Aircraft Combat Survivability Laboratory 
(10) Space Structures Dynamics Laboratory 
(11) Turbo-Propulsion Laboratory 
(12) Marine Propulsion Laboratory 
(13) Secure Wargaming Laboratory 
In some curricula, the faculty and curriculum sponsors take the view that "the real world is the 
laboratory." In order for the officers to understand and perform thesis research on real operations, 
they take extended field trips, called "experience tours," to other military commands and industrial 
centers. This enriching opportunity would not be available at a civilian university without disruption 
of the normal academic schedule. 
3. Required Masters Thesis: The thesis (required at NPS) provides the officers a chance to practice 
their newly developed skills on a problem of military interest and relevance (including classified 
theses up to the SI level). It allows the officers to 
• define a problem to be studied and resolved in a limited amount of time, under a firm 
deadline 
• integrate the materials studied during their time at NPS in order to bring their new academic 
knowledge to bear on a practical problem, and 
• organize, prepare and deliver written and oral versions of their thesis work. 
Most theses represent a high-quality contribution to the DoD. Faculty members are experts in 
military-related research and incorporate their thesis students in their research teams. Some theses 
have resulted in large savings for the Navy. Others have introduced important new ideas that have had 
immediate effect on combat effectiveness. For example, Challenge Athena, which demonstrated a 
dramatic improvement in the ability of commercial satellites to provide essential, high bandwidth 
communication to Navy ships, was developed in a (classified) NPS thesis. When assessing NPS's 
value to the Navy, one should consider the body of valuable research produced by students and 
faculty. 
The thesis is required at NPS because it is considered the keystone of the masters degree 
program. Thesis students work closely with faculty mentors, focusing on DoD problems, often 
producing solutions that make substantive contributions to the Navy and other services. NPS tightly 
integrates the thesis into the educational program. Research-oriented civilian schools focus on 
doctoral-level work, giving little regard (and sometimes no opportunity) for the masters thesis. At the 
typical PhD-producing university, advising of masters theses is not considered a significant 
accomplishment, whereas, at NPS, we consider the quality of MS thesis advising to be one of the 
most important dimensions of faculty instructional performance. 
4. Dealing with Needs of the Adult, Mid-Career Learners After Selection Based on Navy 
Requirements: Many officers do not have the necessary undergraduate preparation for graduate 
study in their assigned field. Due to the selection emphasis on military performance and the skills 
needed by the Navy, in addition to academic performance, the admissions requirements are 
significantly different at NPS than at civilian universities. Before entry, NPS officers are not required 
to be exactly matched into their graduate fields or to provide evidence of high-level academic 
achievement (e.g., high undergraduate grades, recommendations of instructors, and scores on the 
Graduate Record Exams). NPS is extremely adept at efficiently transitioning these officers to new 
fields if it is in the interest of the Navy. (This is particularly important to the military since its closed- 
pipe personnel system precludes mid-career accessions in areas of Navy need.) No civilian university 
routinely faces this requirement to transition its students to new fields or can deal with it as efficiently 
and effectively as NPS. 
Similarly, NPS does an efficient and effective job of refreshing officers who have been away from the 
academic world for a while. Mid-career, adult learners, no matter how bright, need some assistance in 
getting back into the academic mode. 
Meeting NPS officers' transition and refresher needs adds time that civilian masters programs do not 
need to spend. The CNA report recommends the use of distance learning (DL) and computer-based 
instruction to reduce the length of NPS programs. NPS already delivers some graduate instruction by 
video-teleconferencing DL and is actively pursuing asynchronous network-based learning. As 
educational innovators, the NPS faculty welcomes the opportunity to develop these courses in support 
of the officers' needs. However, past experience with correspondence courses and anecdotal evidence 
from our students suggest that little time is available to study during duty assignments. We propose 
that pilot studies be undertaken to develop some courses in order to prove the concept before any 
large-scale implementation. 
Similarly, CNA recommends that officers be given provisional acceptance to NPS, subject to their 
acquiring the undergraduate background needed for their program before arriving at NPS. This 
suggestion is a great disincentive for officers to transition into programs of Navy needs. Few would 
transition into the engineering and science fields and, for those few, the time required for the 
preparation would be prohibitive. For example, about eight undergraduate engineering courses and an 
engineering design project would be required for a non-engineering major to be prepared for 
admission into a graduate engineering program. The result of this recommendation would be for 
officers to seek admission only to programs with minimal entrance requirements, i.e., programs 
outside of the science, engineering, and technical areas of critical Navy need. 
5. Calendar and OPTEMPO: NPS operates 48 weeks a year, compared with civilian universities 
which offer full programs for only 32 weeks per year (semester system) or 33 weeks per year (quarter 
system). Courses at NPS are scheduled in response to curricular requirements, not department 
preferences, improving curricula efficiency. 
In addition, while at NPS, officers take around 16 credit-hours per quarter or 64 credit-hours per year, 
an aggressive academic load that necessitates having more faculty than a civilian school (where most 
faculty are off during the summer). 
NPS respects the officer's scheduled completion date. Programs at civilian universities with thesis 
options have unpredictable duration. Students take as long as they need to finish and are not hastened 
by the faculty, in contrast to NPS, where the faculty understands the career consequences of a student 
not finishing on time. 
6. Military Infrastructure: NPS provides a complete military infrastructure that supports the military 
and professional aspects of the officer's career while at NPS. The officers are still immersed in a 
military environment and are not "away" from their parent service. The presence of fellow officers 
from other services enriches the experience and makes possible joint military education. International 
officer-students also add a unique professional dimension, especially since a large percentage of them 
will ultimately become high-level leaders of their nations' militaries. The experience with officers 
from other nations enhances future performance in combined operations and exercises. In addition the 
presence of military instructors at NPS provides an additional dimension of military presence. It is 
noted that this benefit of maintaining military connectivity does not come without costs, however. 
NPS maintains a military line of command involving a Dean of Students/Director of Programs office, 
headed by an 06, and a set of Curriculum Officers (10 05's) with associated support personnel. This 
line of command would not exist at civilian universities. 
Each of these educational benefits has evolved over time at NPS in response to Navy needs. They 
collectively establish NPS as a unique educational institution that is closely coupled to the Navy's 
requirements. Establishment of graduate education programs at civilian institutions will require study of 
whether these attributes should be retained or not, since civilian programs will have to be reorganized to 
provide them. Any efforts to compete NPS against civilian institutions will have to clearly specify the 
features desired. 
Utilization Issues 
The CNA report finds that the P-code subspecialty system results in increased curriculum 
specificity.5 In turn, this specificity is assumed to contribute to the "high" cost of an NPS education. The 
report concludes that, with low P-code utilization rates, the "high" education costs due to this perceived 
specificity are not justified. Thus, the CNA report recommends that the Navy move toward less specific 
curriculum requirements to allow streamlining of curricula; the elimination of small, inefficient curricula; 
competition with civilian universities to offer the resulting, general programs; and the development of a 
more generic program leading to a degree such as a "Master of Science in Military Management and 
Technology."6 
In contrast, the analysis provided in the remainder of this report indicates that NPS provides cost- 
effective graduate education including curriculum specificity. The extent to which curriculum specificity 
increases program duration is unclear; thus, the additional costs of maintaining specificity are not 
quantified in the CNA report. 
Furthermore, the benefits of a P-code driven educational program have not been assessed in the 
CNA report. The P-code-driven curriculum model currently serves a number of shore-based (and some 
fleet-based) communities exceedingly well; these communities value graduate education and have high 
fill and utilization rates. Loss of these curricula would severely impact the effectiveness of these 
communities. 
Since the P-code system was devised to support only the shore-based activities of the Navy, it is 
not clear that the utilization rates and other such measures capture the true impact of graduate education. 
In the absence of any assessment instruments, it is particularly difficult to capture the impact of graduate 
education on the URL officers who have attended NPS. Numerous flag visitors have attested that, while 
they have not recently used the specific disciplinary information received at NPS, they have definitely 
benefited from the resultant critical thinking skills and problem-analysis capabilities throughout their 
career. 
We caution against substituting a generic program leading to a degree such as a "Master of 
Science in Military Management and Technology" for the traditional technical curricula. Such a generic 
program, while perhaps appropriate for some warfighters, runs counter to the trend of increasing 
sophistication of systems and the skills needed to utilize them fully. The Navy would be best served by 
having a significant fraction of officers familiar with the details of the technology. Navy leaders should 
consider the advantages of having a "dual-track" graduate education system for both those who use 
technology and those who foster its development and insertion in support of warfighting needs. 
Cost Competition 
The CNA report recommended that graduate degree programs for Naval officers be competed 
from multiple providers including NPS to establish a market mechanism for achieving cost-effective 
delivery.7 However, such a market mechanism requires that the requirements of program offerings are 
clearly stated and held constant. The requirements to be included in a request for proposals should 
include: 
' CNA, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," pp. 60-63. 
' CNA, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," p. 5. 
CNA, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," pp. 71. 
10 
requiring that officers complete a military-relevant thesis 
maintaining a military command infrastructure 
offering classified courses and opportunities for classified thesis research 
providing specialized educational laboratories devoted to military hardware and computer 
systems 
providing military-relevant course material 
committing to predetermined officer graduation dates 
providing each officer with at least 16 contact hours per week, including in the summer 
letting admissions be determined predominately on military performance, in addition to academic 
performance, and letting admissions functions be shared with the Navy 
providing refresher and transition courses 
and any other requirements, as necessary. 
Cost-Effectiveness of NPS in Delivering Graduate Education 
The CNA report uses data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) to 
compare the costs of NPS graduate education and the cost of education at 28 top ranked civilian 
universities offering engineering Ph.D. programs. In their comparative cost analysis, CNA concludes "... 
that in 1993-1994 NPS's expenditures were in the top-quartile for total and educational expenditures per 
student."8 They found that NPS is the most expensive school when the comparison considered only 
tuition costs for the civilian schools. This leads CNA to recommend strategies to reduce the "high" costs 
of an NPS education and later to suggest that the Navy consider greater use of civilian schools. In 
particular, CNA recommended that 
"...Navy schools be invited to compete along with civilian schools for contracts to 
furnish educational services that meet Navy needs. Educational contracts need not go to 
the lowest bidder, but would presumably go to the most cost-effective provider. Faced 
with competition, Navy schools would be encouraged to seek out their own opportunities 
for efficiency gains, eliminating the need to benchmark spending. Even if the Navy 
makes no changes in its choice of providers, we would expect competition to improve 
efficiency."9 
Competition and expanded use of civilian schools can take on three forms: transferring control (and, 
perhaps, ownership) of NPS to a civilian institution, transferring all officers in particular curricula to 
another specific civilian sector curricula, and transferring individual or small groups of officers to any of 
several approved civilian programs. 
CNA, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," page 70. 
1
 CNA, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," pp. 7. 
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The cost-effectiveness analysis in the remainder of this report considers the first and third of these 
options. The cost of the second option should be between the two considered. More specifically, the 
analysis is designed to answer two questions: 
• Can DoN expect to reduce its graduate education costs by transferring NPS ownership and 
operational control to a civilian sector university? 
• Can DoN reduce its graduate education costs by sending officers to civilian institutions rather 
than NPS? 
To answer the first question, this analysis compares the cost of operating NPS to the total cost of 
graduate education at civilian institutions, after normalizing for several factors. These factors are: student 
salaries and benefits, transition and refresher courses, course loads and contact hours, and lower 
undergraduate costs (the results are summarized in Figures 1 and 2 below). The second question is 
addressed by comparing the cost of operating NPS to the cost of tuition at civilian institutions. Costs in 
this comparison are normalized for student salaries and benefits, transition and refresher courses, and 
course loads and contact hours (these results are summarized in Figure 3 below). 
The analysis to follow shows that, after normalizing costs across institutions, the Navy is 
unlikely to reduce its graduate education costs by transferring NPS operational control and 
ownership to a civilian institution, unless that institution is willing to subsidize DoN students 
through its endowment or state tax funding. Similarly, cost savings from sending NPS officers to 
civilian universities are limited and must be balanced against NPS's unique benefits as described 
earlier in this report. As a result, a competitive contracting process is unlikely to find a more cost- 
effective provider than NPS. The detailed analysis supporting these conclusions follows. 
An appropriate comparison between NPS and civilian sector alternatives should be structured as a 
"cost-effectiveness" analysis. A cost-effectiveness analysis is appropriate when it is impractical to 
consider the dollar value of the benefits provided by alternatives under consideration. Given the difficulty 
in identifying the dollar value of an NPS or civilian sector education, a cost-effectiveness analysis is 
appropriate. This approach is the standard for policy and program analysis; it is also mandated by OMB 
Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Cost-Benefit Analysis of Federal Programs. This 
Circular applies to all agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, including analyses 
conducted within or for the Department of the Navy (DoN) or the Department of Defense (DoD). 
More detailed guidance for cost-effectiveness analyses is found in many references.10 The cost 
analysis portion of CNA's report is most appropriately interpreted as a "fixed effectiveness" cost- 
effectiveness analysis.11 This approach compares the costs of altemitive means to provide a fixed benefit; 
the least expensive approach is the most cost effective. The key to using this approach is to ensure that the 
assumed benefits are as consistent as possible across the alternatives. 
While the CNA analysis provides a useful first step, it currently falls short of a comprehensive 
cost-effectiveness analysis. As outlined earlier in this critique, there are significant educational 
differences between NPS and civilian graduate programs that are not accounted for in CNA's analysis. 
Many of these have cost impacts that are easily estimated, particularly the refresher and transition courses 
10
 For example, Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice, by David L. Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, Prentice Hall, 
1989. 
11
 Weimer and Vining, page 221. 
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and the extra academic loads taken by NPS students. The cost impacts of these factors will be 
incorporated here, using data from CNA and N81u. 
There are several differences between NPS and civilian sector graduate programs that bias any 
comparisons based on IPEDS data, including CNA's analysis. These differences include: 
1. Student Salaries and Benefits 
The IPEDS data and the CNA analysis consider only the cost of education. Full-time military 
graduate students receive full salary and benefits while attending school. The total cost of a 
Master's degree includes both salary and benefits payments and educational expenses. Salary 
and housing costs can create significant cost differences across institutions if graduate 
programs differ in duration. 
2. Transition and Refresher Courses 
NPS offers transition and refresher courses for officers entering graduate programs that differ 
from their undergraduate degrees and to compensate for any lags between undergraduate and 
graduate enrollment; civilian programs include only degree-related graduate education, 
students must be fully prepared before entering the program. 
3. Course Loads and Contact Hours (Calendar and OPTEMPO) 
NPS requires officers both to carry a heavier class load each quarter and to attend classes 
more weeks per year than'do civilian sector universities. Officers are exposed to more 
material per time period at NPS than at civilian sector universities. 
4. Lower Undergraduate Education Costs (Cross-Subsidies) 
NPS has no undergraduate program, while all civilian universities included in CNA's 
comparison offer both undergraduate and graduate degrees. Graduate education is widely 
acknowledged to be more expensive than undergraduate education, artificially lowering the 
cited civilian sector costs relative to NPS. 
5. Endowments and State Funding 
Civilian-sector universities have endowments or state funding that cover a significant portion 
of graduate school costs; tuition covers a relatively small portion of total costs. 
We now consider a detailed discussion of each of the five cost factors. 
1.   Student Salaries and Benefits 
CNA reports that the average NPS student spends 22.8 months in residence at NPS. This 
compares to an average program of 24 months for Navy URL officers enrolled in graduate programs at 
civilian institutions (called "civins") in 1994.13 If NPS resident and civins programs are of different 
12
 "Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments)," 
Ser N81/3U639949, 29 March 1993. 
13
 Data are from the Manager of Navy CIVINS programs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA. 
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durations, any cost comparison must include the opportunity cost of the officers' time. This is a 
significant portion of the total cost of graduate education for Navy and Marine Corps officers. N81 
estimated the cost of salary, benefits, and housing (referred to as MPN costs) for both NPS-resident and 
civins students.14 In particular, N81 estimated that in FY1994 the annual MPN cost per NPS-resident 
officer was $63,300, compared with the annual MPN cost of $72,300 per officer-student at civilian 
institutions. The higher MPN cost for the civins officer-students reflects differences in housing costs. 
NPS-resident officers predominantly live in base housing; DoN civins officer-students live in more 
expensive off-base housing. (Note that NPS MPN costs include base-housing maintenance.) 
Using N81's estimated MPN costs, CNA's IPEDS educational cost data, and the average program 
length for NPS and civins students, we can calculate the present value of the total cost of a master's 
degree. In this calculation, second year costs are discounted to reflect the time value of money. (Present 
value calculations reflect the direction in OMB circular A-94 for analyses involving multi-period 
decisions.) The calculations here use a 2.1% real discount rate; this was the short-term real discount rate 
mandated in 1994 by Appendix C to OMB Circular A-94. (Appendix C is updated annually, but the 1994 
discount rate was used in this analysis for consistency with the 1994 IPEDS cost data.15) In these 
calculations, the total educational expenditures in dollars per FTE are assumed to remain constant in real 
terms (increase in nominal terms at the rate of inflation) during the officer's graduate program. 
Incorporating program duration and MPN costs reduces the total cost of an NPS graduate degree 
relative to civilian sector universities. In particular, NPS's cost of a graduate degree is $231,024; the most 
expensive master's degree from the schools on CNA's list is $387,947 for the California Institute of 
Technology (Cal Tech), the cheapest degree is $175,091 for the University of Maryland-College Park. 
The weighted average cost of a master's degree is $210,112. This adjustment moves NPS from the fifth to 
the ninth most expensive school on CNA's list. This reflects both the civins program's longer duration 
and the higher housing costs. The cumulative effect of this and later adjustments is shown in Figure 1. 
2.  Transition and Refresher Courses 
NPS provides officers transition and refresher courses before they begin their graduate education 
at NPS. CNA estimates that this accounts for 21% of the time the average officer spends at NPS. 
According to CNA, the average NPS residency is 22.8 months; by inference from CNA's data, 18 months 
(79%) is spent in graduate courses and 4.8 months (21%) is spent in transition (20%) and refresher (1%) 
courses.16 
Transition and refresher courses are not graduate requirements at NPS. In contrast, these courses 
reflect Navy policy that selects officers for graduate work based on criteria beyond their undergraduate 
background and academic performance. If the Navy chose to adopt traditional civilian sector admissions 
standards, these courses could be eliminated from NPS's curriculum. On the other hand, if NPS officers 
were transferred to equivalent civilian sector programs, these costs would be incurred at the civilian 
universities. 
Transition and refresher course costs are not included in the civilian graduate program costs as 
measured in the IPEDS database. To include these costs as part of NPS's graduate degree program 
inappropriately biases the analysis against NPS. To compare NPS and civilian graduate program costs 
14
 "Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments)," 
Ser N81/3U639949, 29 March 1993). 
15
 OMB Circular A-94, "Guidelines and Discount Rates for Cost-Benefit Analysis of Federal Programs: Appendix 
C," revised January 1998. 
16
 CNA, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," page 66. 
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more accurately, transition and refresher course costs should be eliminated from NPS's cost base, just as 
they are from the civilian alternative. 
To make this adjustment, the average residency at NPS can be reduced by 21%, to reflect CNA's 
estimate of the purely graduate course work at NPS. As stated, this reduces NPS average residency to 18 
months and NPS's graduate program costs to $182,919. No adjustment is required for the civilian sector 
EPEDS cost data. Eliminating transition and refresher course costs from NPS's cost base lowers NPS from 
the ninth most expensive program to the 22nd most expensive program. NPS now becomes the eighth 
least expensive program. 
3. Course Loads and Contact Hours (Calendar and OPTEMPO) 
In addition to the preceding differences, a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis should 
correct for differences in program content across alternative institutions. NPS programs satisfy both 
traditional academic degree and Navy P-code subspecialty requirements. With these dual requirements, 
NPS programs are likely to include program content beyond that found in civilian institutions. Ideally, a 
cost-effectiveness analysis would compare NPS program content to the content of corresponding civilian 
programs. However, detailed program content data is not readily available. In fact, CNA states that they 
did not consider specific degree programs in their analysis. 
There are two possible measures to capture differences in program content, program credit hours 
and program class hours. Credit hours and class hours are inputs to the education process. However, each 
can serve as a proxy for program content if this input is similar across institutions. In other words, this 
comparison is appropriate if there is consistency across the programs in the rate at which faculty can 
deliver and students can absorb class material. There is no reason to believe that NPS faculty and students 
are less able to deliver and absorb material than their civilian counterparts. 
NPS officers carry a heavier class load per quarter and attend classes more weeks per year than 
civilian sector universities. In particular, NPS officers typically have 16 contact hours per week and 
attend classes 48 weeks per year. As a result, the typical NPS officer receives credit for 64 contact hours 
per year and attends 768 hours of instruction per year. In contrast, civilian sector graduate students 
typically attend classes 13 hours per week for 32 weeks during the standard academic year. During the 
summer, some students attend classes seven hours per week for ten weeks. Thus, the typical civilian 
sector student is unlikely to receive more than approximately 486 hours of instruction per year, including 
summer classes. 
This analysis uses class hours as a proxy for program content. Credit hours have different 
implications for quarter and semester system programs and cost per credit hour comparisons would not 
correct for the extra weeks of instruction in the typical NPS academic year. In particular, NPS officers 
receive 1,152 hours of graduate instruction in the 18 months after they complete their refresher and 
transition courses. In contrast, civilian institutions provide 972 hours of graduate instruction in their 
typical 24-month graduate programs. These values are used to convert total graduate program costs to 
graduate program costs per hour of instruction. 
Figure 1 shows the results of combining the adjustments for officer salaries and housing, the need 
for transition and refresher courses, the forty-eight week NPS school year, and the increased academic 
load at NPS. (The "expected graduate class premium" assumes that graduate education is twice as 
expensive as undergraduate education as explained in section 4 that follows.) Even without this graduate 
premium, NPS has the lowest graduate program costs per hour of instruction among the universities in 
CNA's list. NPS's graduate education costs are $159 per class hour; civilian sector costs range from $399 
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per class hour (Cal Tech) to $180 per class hour (University of Maryland-College Park). The weighted 
civilian sector average is $215 per class hour. 
It is interesting to note that the same result pertains if this adjustment is applied to the NPS 
program including transition and refresher courses. Including transition and refresher courses would 
increase both class hours and total program costs by the same percentage. Cost per class hour would be 
unaffected. Nevertheless, both this and the previous adjustment portray 
important considerations. This adjustment indicates that NPS offers a more intensive instructional 
program than typical civilian universities. The prior adjustment indicates that NPS officers typically 
graduate more quickly than students in equivalent civilian graduate programs. 
These two adjustments help explain the seeming contradiction between CNA's results and the 
results reported here. NPS's intensive academic program requires a similarly intensive use of faculty, 
staff, facilities and equipment. This will increase NPS's annual costs per officer, as reported by CNA. A 
higher annual cost per officer is the disadvantage of intensive education. However, a more intensive 
educational program also exposes officers to more material per unit time, allows them to graduate more 
quickly, and reduces the associated officer salary and benefit costs. These are benefits of the more 
intensive education. CNA's analysis only measures the disadvantages of NPS's relatively intensive 
education; this analysis incorporates the advantages. The results reported here indicate that the advantages 
outweigh the disadvantages. 
4. Lower Undergraduate Education Costs (Cross-Subsidies) 
It is generally acknowledged that graduate education is more expensive than undergraduate 
education. Larger undergraduate class size and instruction by graduate teaching assistants are at least two 
of the reasons to expect this cost difference. Graduate instruction and research also require more 
expensive equipment and specialized laboratories, especially if every student is required to complete a 
Master's thesis. This is particularly significant for technical graduate programs. 
Unfortunately, the magnitude of this difference is difficult to estimate. One analysis found that 
graduate education was two to three times as expensive as undergraduate education in studies Conducted 
by three states: Washington, Florida and Illinois.17 However, the report noted that each state used a 
different method to collect data and allocate costs across programs. While this may indicate that cost 
comparisons are relatively insensitive to differences in data collection and cost allocation, the study's 
authors cautioned against extrapolating these results to other states. 
The CNA report uses IPEDS data that combine undergraduate and graduate costs for all schools 
except NPS. The 28 comparison schools include a graduate student body that ranges from 15% to 66% of 
the total student body; the weighted average graduate population is 35% of the student body. Only a 
portion of these graduate students are in engineering and other equipment- and laboratory-intensive 
programs. NPS is 100% graduate students, with a relatively high percentage of students in technical and 
engineering graduate programs. This biases the comparison against NPS. 
17
 Peter D. Syverson and Moira J. Maguire, "Estimating Institutional Costs of Graduate Education: Reports from 
Three States Demonstrate Promise, Pitfalls of Cost Studies," Council of Graduate Schools, 1997. 
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Figure 1 
Comparative NPS Graduate Military Education Costs 
Annual costs per student,1 with adjustments for students' salary/benefits,2 program duration,3 






n    $300 




■ Estimated Graduate Class Premium 
m                                                              □ MPN Costs 
|                                                               D Average Educational Costs 
1 1 I |                                             Weighted Average $318/ClassHour 
+1' M11111' j | |tm|Ti MM. 
- 1 111 111 111 111 l|l 111 111 111 li1111 l| 1 111 111 111 l| 1 11 Nill |l 111111111 1 |l l|1 l| 1 111 111111 1 |l 11 
5 
a I   =5 I  a 
< .2 
* 1 o I 
3 5 
£   u 
"S     3 
School 
1  a 
o 
o 
I  a 
-      ° 
3 
E    | 
Student population is defined as full time equivalent students at NPS; fall enrollment elsewhere. 
2Military Salary and benefits is $63,300/year at NPS; $72,300 elsewhere, reflecting higher off-base housing costs. 
Program duration is 24 months at civilian universities. 
3NPS program duration is 22.8 months, including transition and refresher courses. 
4NPS graduate program duration is 18 months, excluding transition and refresher courses. 
5Civilian universities include 972 class hours (a 24 month program with 13 class hours/week for 32 weeks during 
the normal academic year, plus 7 class hours/week for 10 weeks during the summer). NPS program includes 1152 
class hours (an 18 month program with 16 class hours/week, 48 weeks/year). The NPS cost per class hour would be 
the same for the graduate program plus transition and refresher courses (class hours and program costs both 
increase proportionally). 
There are at least two ways to account for this inconsistency. One approach uses the IPEDS data 
to impute a cost per graduate student. CNA provides data on total costs, total full time equivalent (FTE) 
students (measured in this data by Fall enrollments), and percent graduate student body. Assuming that 
graduate school costs are two to three times as high as undergraduate student costs, this data can be used 
to impute a cost per graduate student for each of the civilian sector universities. This will increase the real 
resource costs of the civilian universities, while not affecting NPS costs per graduate credit hour. The 
results of this adjustment, assuming that graduate costs are twice as high as undergraduate, costs, are 
reported as the "expected graduate class premium" bars in Figure 1. As expected, this adjustment 
increases NPS's cost advantage per graduate class hour relative to civilian institutions. In particular, 
NPS's graduate education cost is $159 per class hour, as found above; civilian sector costs with graduate 
premiums range from $525 per class hour at Cal Tech to $282 per class hour at the University of Texas- 
Austin. The weighted civilian sector average costs with the graduate premium is $318 per class hour. 
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An alternative correction is to plot the cost per student against the percentage of graduate students 
for the 28 comparison schools. A trend line can be estimated from this data that projects the average cost 
per student as a function of the graduate population. The cost per student at NPS can be compared to this 
trend line to determine if NPS is above or below this trend. This correction is illustrated in Figure 2. Two 
trend lines have been included for reference: a linear trend line (dashed) and a logarithmic trend line 
(solid). In either case, NPS is well below the trend line, indicating that NPS's total cost per student is 
below the average that would be expected at civilian sector schools with 100% graduate students. 
5. Endowments and State Funding 
The EPEDS data reported by CNA indicate that average tuition payments in the civilian sector are 
only 27.5% of the total cost of education. The remainder is covered by endowments and state tax funding. 
NPS has no endowment and is currently restricted from developing one. Thus, the Navy must pay 100% 
of the education costs at NPS. NPS faces an inherent cost disadvantage in providing graduate education 
for a budgetary cost that competes with civilian sector tuition. 
The Navy is concerned about the budgetary implications of its military education decisions. CNA 
reports that NPS has a significantly higher annual "tuition" cost than all other civilian sector universities. 
CNA also reports that NPS's annual "tuition" cost is $59,488; tuition costs for the civilian universities in 
CNA's analysis range from a high of $20,014 for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to a low of 
$2,805 for Texas A&M University. 
Again, this cost comparison does not consider either the cost of officers' MPN costs or NPS's 
more intensive educational program. These factors reduce NPS's cost disadvantages in two ways: NPS's 
intensive instructional program reduces residency requirements at NPS relative to civins for a given class 
hour requirement, and NPS has lower MPN costs (due to lower housing costs). To account for these 
differences, the IPEDS data in the CNA report can be modified to include MPN costs and to equate class 
hours across NPS and civilian universities. To equate class hours, either the NPS program can be 
shortened to 972 graduate class hours, the typical civilian program requirement, or the civilian programs 
can be extended to 1,152 class hours, the typical NPS program. The results of the latter modification are 
shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 shows that NPS total program costs, including MPN, are the 19th lowest among the 29 schools 
considered, even when civilian sector schools are valued at their tuition costs. In particular, the present 
value of NPS's total cost per officer for a 1,152 class-hour program is $182,900, compared to $215,500 
for MIT (the most expensive program by this measurement), and $175,300 for Texas A&M (the least 
expensive program by this measurement). The present value of the weighted average total cost per student 
is $191,500. For a 972 class-hour program, the present value of NPS's total cost per officer is $154,700, 
compared to $182,700 for MIT and $148,700 for Texas A&M; the present value of the weighted average 
total cost per student is 
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Figure 2 
Projected Civilian Graduate Education Costs per Year 
Uses BPEDS data on total education costs and percent graduate student population, reported by CNA, to 
project education costs as the percent graduate student population increases. 
Expenditure per Full-Time-Equivalent 
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$162,400. Thus, NPS remains cost competitive with civilian sector schools even if the civilian program 
costs are valued only at the tuition values plus MPN. 
Figure 3 also shows that MPN costs dominate the tuition costs in calculating the total cost of a 
graduate degree. NPS remains cost competitive with tuition costs at civilian schools, despite their 
endowment and state tax financing subsidies, because NPS has lower MPN costs. Lower MPN costs 
reflect the more intensive educational program and lower housing costs at NPS. This distinction is 
illustrated in Figure 3. Figure 3 breaks the present value of total costs per officer, for a 1,152-hour 
program into its tuition and MPN cost components. From Figure 3, it is obvious that NPS compensates 
for higher "tuition " costs with lower MPN costs. CNA's cost comparison captures only the tuition cost 
differences; this analysis incorporates the MPN cost implications. 
6. Cost Analysis Summary 
The IPEDS data reported by CNA indicate that NPS has higher annual costs per FTE than comparable 
civilian sector schools. However, this comparison does not indicate that civilian universities could more 
cost-effectively provide the services NPS offers. In particular, NPS and civilian schools can not be 
compared on the basis on the IPEDS data; NPS's unique mission and officer body is not comparable to 
civilian universities without further adjustments. 
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Preliminary adjustments were described and incorporated in this analysis. In particular, the 
IPEDS and NPS education costs were modified to: 
• reflect the total cost of producing a graduate, including MPN; 
• separate the cost of NPS's graduate courses from transition and refresher courses; 
account for NPS' s heavier class load and additional weeks of instruction; • 
• highlight the fact that NPS offers only graduate education while civilian universities also 
provide undergraduate education, which is less expensive. 
After making these adjustments, it appears that NPS provides cost-effective graduate education compared 
to the civilian universities included in CNA's report. Figure 1 demonstrates that NPS's costs are lower 
than comparable costs at civilian universities. This comparison is based on total graduate program costs 
per class hour. Per OMB circular A-94, this comparison measures the real cost of military graduate 
education, as is appropriate in evaluating public sector programs. This comparison indicates that DoN 
should not expect significant education cost savings by transferring NPS ownership and oversight to a 
civilian university; education costs would likely increase. 
Figure 3 demonstrates that NPS remains cost competitive with civilian sector universities when 
evaluated on tuition costs. This reflects NPS's intensive academic program and lower MPN costs. This 
indicates that the potential total cost savings from sending Navy and Marine Corps officers to civilian 
universities is limited; in many cases the total costs are higher at civilian universities after correcting for 
class hours. Of course, any cost savings must be balanced against benefits of NPS as described earlier in 
this critique. 
The results of this cost analysis are consistent with one of CNA's findings. CNA reports that NPS 
accreditation reviews commented on both the heavy student and faculty workloads. This reflects NPS's 
intensive academic program. The cost-effectiveness implications of heavy student and faculty workloads 
and the resulting intensive academic program are not captured by the IPEDS annual education cost data. 
The adjustments incorporated here account for these factors and more accurately measure cost- 
effectiveness. 
CNA concludes that there are two major factors accounting for the "high" costs of an NPS 
education: program duration and specificity of the curriculum.18 The analysis presented here counters 
these findings. Program duration is largely driven by the Navy's policy of both delaying entry into 
graduate education after officers complete their undergraduate degrees and requiring some officers to 
change their course of study from their undergraduate degrees in order to meet Navy needs. This policy 
has both costs and benefits. This policy is vital to allow the Navy to meet its specialty requirements 
despite its closed-pipe personnel system that precludes mid-career accessions in areas of Navy need. 
However, it increases education costs and program length, whether officers attend NPS or civilian 
universities. If Navy policy requires that officers attend transition and refresher courses, the analysis 
provided here indicates that NPS delivers these courses more cost-effectively than the civilian universities 
highlighted by CNA. Transferring officers to resident civilian university programs is not likely to reduce 
the real cost of the transition and refresher courses. In evaluating NPS's cost-effectiveness it is important 
to distinguish between the costs NPS controls and the cost implications of the Navy's graduate military 
education policy. 
:
 CNA, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," page 72. 
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There may also be effective alternatives for providing transition and refresher courses. However, 
the costs and benefits and cost-effectiveness of the current policy and its alternatives (including the 
opportunity cost of the officers' time) should be systematically evaluated before recommending dramatic 
changes to the current system. 
The analysis presented here also has implications for CNA's P-code utilization discussion. CNA 
concludes that the P-code system drives curriculum specificity. In turn, this contributes to the "high" cost 
of an NPS education. With low P-code utilization rates, the resulting high education costs might not be 
justified. Thus, CNA recommends moving toward a program leading to a generic degree in military 
management and technology. We feel that such generic approach, with option tracks that allow some 
specialization, might be appropriate for the URL officer; however, this approach would not meet the 
Navy's needs for technical subspecialists in the restricted line or specialty communities. 
In contrast, the analysis provided here indicates that NPS provides cost effective graduate 
education despite curriculum specificity. The extent to which curriculum specificity increases program 
duration through transition and refresher course requirements is unclear and has not been analyzed; thus, 
the costs of maintaining specificity are unknown. Furthermore, the benefits of NPS's P-code driven 
educational program has not been assessed. Benefits include the value of P-code driven curriculum versus 
a more generic curriculum for the restricted and unrestricted line officers that fill exactly matching and 
closely related P-coded billets. If the value of exact and close matches is significant, and the costs of 
specificity low, NPS's current curriculum structure may be appropriate. Similarly, it is important to 
evaluate the benefits of a P-code driven curriculum against the benefits of more generic curriculum for 
officers who never fill exact or closely matching billets. The additional benefits of a generic curriculum 
on general officer performance may be significant; or they may be limited. These issues should be 
assessed in a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis before concluding that the Navy should restructure 
NPS's curricula because of the current P-code utilization rates. There may well be a convincing argument 
that the 21st century Navy needs technically educated officers. One should think carefully before 
mandating that all officers-students should take management degrees. 
Critique Summary 
In 1909, the Navy decided to make a strategic investment in developing its junior officers. It put 
in place an enlightened program that allowed its brightest officers, with proven military leadership skills, 
to recapitalize their intellectual skills at a critical point in their career paths. The leadership decided at that 
time that civilian universities could not provide exactly the desired program; so they established the 
predecessor of NPS to provide the environment and the programs that would produce the desired goals. 
The resulting program can be considered a model for providing mid-career, professional, technical 
education. 
The present curricula and operation of NPS have evolved over time in response to Navy needs. 
Specifically, NPS programs provide specific benefits to the Navy beyond traditional graduate-degree 
programs. These benefits include the military relevance of the programs, the specialized facilities that 
extend this military relevance, the theses and studies that support DoD and the Navy, an admissions 
process focused on military performance of the officers rather than academic performance, an efficient 
refresher and transition system that meets the Navy's mid-career professional development of the officer 
corps in areas of technical need, an intense academic schedule that fully absorbs the officers' energies, 
and a military infrastructure that keeps the officers fully involved in their profession. 
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The P-code system was established to meet the shore-based needs of the Navy; it mostly ignores 
the benefits that graduate education provides to billets at sea. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the 
benefits of graduate education (e.g., problem analysis, solution synthesis, critical thinking skills, time 
management) carry over into non-P-coded billets and have special impact at flag rank. The challenge is to 
devise an assessment system that measures the impact of these skills in order to make critical decisions 
about benefits and costs of graduate education. The Navy's graduate education must then meet the needs 
of both the warfighter and the subspecialist; a generic management and technology program cannot 
provide the level of content required by the subspecialists and some warfighters.. 
Contrary to the CNA's analysis, our cost study indicates that NPS is highly cost efficient when 
the following factors are included: (1) the officers' salary and benefits (including housing), (2) the costs 
of transition and refresher courses that have been established to meet the Navy's policies of delaying 
graduate study until some on-the-job experience has been obtained and to transition officers into technical 
areas of study to meet Navy needs, (3) the higher number of hours that officers are in contact with the 
faculty at NPS, and (4) the extra expense of technical graduate education compared to schools that can 
subsidize their graduate programs with their undergraduate enrollments. 
The Committee cautions that any attempt to have NPS compete for programs against civilian 
institutions must decide in advance what non-degree benefits will be provided. Must the institutions 
provide refresher and transition support? Must the institutions accept all officers that the Navy sends or 
will they apply their existing graduate-program admission standards? Must a thesis be part of the 
program? These and other requirements need to be addressed in order to fairly compete for provision of 
the programs. 
CNA made also recommendations that the Navy explore the possibility of merging NPS and 
AFIT, and explore legislative relief to allow the establishment of endowments. These policy revision are 
outside of the purview of the NPS faculty. The Committee has no objections to the exploration of these 
issues. CNA also encourages consideration of fencing funding within a fiscal year in order to remove 
funding instabilities. The Committee welcomes this idea since it would add stability to annual funding 
cycle. 
The Committee believes that the primary question that should have been addressed in any outside 
study of NPS is whether NPS has accomplished its mission. Does NPS contribute to the combat 
effectiveness of the Navy? While we answer this question strongly affirmative, the CNA study would have 
been an opportune time for an independent answer. We believe the issues raised in our report are relevant 
if this inquiry is made. 
In closing, we quote Vice Admiral John Scott Redd, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy of the 
Joint Staff, who earned an M.S. in operations research with distinction from NPS in 1978. During a recent 
graduation speech at NPS, VADM Redd mentioned that "he had turned in his numbers license long ago," 
indicating that he was no longer a practicing operations analyst. Nevertheless, the following remarks 
show that he derives profound and lasting value from his NPS education whether or not he is serving in a 
matching P-coded billet. 
"The purpose of this letter is to put in writing my feelings on the value of the education I 
received at the Naval Postgraduate School and its impact on my career. The two years my 
family and I spent in Monterey were among the best in our lives and the education I 
acquired there has proven priceless. I have experienced first-hand the critical importance 
of higher education in a naval officer's career. It is important not only for the technical 
competence and skills gained in specific fields of study, but also for the expansion of 
one's mental horizon achieved from exposure to a broad range of new ideas. Most 
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importantly, however, higher education engenders a disciplined manner of examining 
problems, which is useful regardless of the technical requirements of one's duties. 
"Indeed, I have found that the method of thinking and problem solving instilled during 
my attainment of an operations research degree has been useful in a variety of positions, 
most of them in the realm of national security policy. At the Naval Postgraduate School I 
acquired an educational storehouse and critical thought process that I have drawn on 
throughout my subsequent career, especially after achieving flag rank. All too often, 
senior leaders do not have time to build new intellectual capital - they just consume it. 
"The years I spent in Monterey were important in other ways as well. They allowed me to 
develop lasting bonds of friendship with my fellow students."19 
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1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd, STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library, Code 013 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Road 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. Research Office, Code 09 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5138 
4. ADM Jay L. Johnson, USN 1 
Chief of Naval Operations 
2000 Navy Pentagon - 4E660 
Washington, DC 20350-2000 
5. ADM Donald Pilling, USN 1 
Vice Chief of Naval Operations 
2000 Navy Pentagon - 4E636 
Washington, DC 20350-2000 
6. VADM Thomas Fargo, USN 1 
DCNO Plans, Policies and Operations (N3/N5) 
2000 Navy Pentagon - 4E592 
Washington, DC 20350-2000 
7. VADM Robert Natter, USN 1 
Director, Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control (N6) 
2000 Navy Pentagon - PT 5000 
Washington, DC 20450-2000 
8. VADM Patricia Tracey, USN 1 
Director of Naval Training (N7) 
2000 Navy Pentagon - 4E536 
Washington, DC 20450-2000 
9. VADM John W. Craine, Jr., USN 1 
Director of Naval Training (N7) 
2000 Navy Pentagon - 4E536 
Washington, DC 20450-2000 
10. RADM Arthur Längsten, HI, USN 1 
Director, Navy Staff (N09B) 
2000 Navy Pentagon - 4E623 
Washington, DC 20450-2000 
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11. Major General George F. Close, Jr., USA 
Director 
Operational Plans & Interoperability Directorate 
7000 Joint Staff Pentagon 2B865 
Washington, DC 20318-7000 
12. Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell, USA 
Director 
Force Structure Resource & Assessment Directorate 
8000 Joint Staff Pentagon 1E962 
Washington, DC 20318-8000 
13. RADM Raymond Smith, Jr., USN 
Director, Assessment Division (N81) 
2000 Navy Pentagon, 
Washington, DC 20350-2000 
14. Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA 
Office of the Commandant 
U.S. Army War College 
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050 
15. Brigadier General Franklin J. Blaisdell, USAF 
Office of the Commandant 
Armed Forces Staff College 
7800 Hampton Blvd. 
Norfolk, VA 23511-1702 
16. VADM Arthur Cebrowski, USN 
President, Naval War College 
686 Cushing Road 
Newport, RI 02841-5010 
17. RADM Peter A.C. Long, USN 
Provost, Naval War College 
686 Cushing Road 
Newport, RI 02841-5010 
18. VADM John Ryan, USN 
Superintendent, U.S. Naval Academy 
121 Blake Road 
Annapolis, MD 21402-5000 
19. LTG Daniel W. Christman, USA 
Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy 
Bldg 600, Room 206 
West Point, NY 10996 
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20. Mr. Robert Murray 
Center for Naval Analyses 
4401 Ford Avenue 
Alexandria, VA 22302-1498 
21. Dr. Donald Cymrot 
Center for Naval Analyses 
4401 Ford Avenue 
Alexandria, VA 22302-1498 
22. Dr. Linda Cavalluzzo 
Center for Naval Analyses 
4401 Ford Avenue 
Alexandria, VA 22302-1498 
23. Dr. Steven Trachtenberg 
President, George Washington University 
21211 Street, NW 
Suite 802 
Washington, DC 20052 
24. LCDR Chris Agan, USN 
CNA Executive Panel 
4401 Ford Avenue 
Alexandria, VA 22302-0268 
25. CAPT John Petrie, USN 
Executive Director, CNA Executive Panel 
4401 Ford Avenue 
Alexandria, VA 22302-0268 
26. Honorable Beverley Byron 
4000 Cathedral Avenue, NW 
Suite 848-B 
Washington, DC 20016 
27. Mr. Walter Anderson 
Editor, Parade Publications 
711 Third Avenue 
7th Floor 
New York, NY 10017 
28. Dr. Jack Borsting 
Executive Director, USC 
Center for Telecomm Management 
3415 S. Figueroa, Suite #217 
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0871 
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29. GEN Michael Cams (USAF Ret) 
Executive Director 
Center for International Political Economy 
47 West Street 
Suite 10B 
New York, NY 10006 
30. Mr. Lawrence Cavaiola 
Vice President 
Ingalls Shipbuilding 
1725 Jefferson Davis Hwy, Suite 601 
Arlington, VA 22202 
31. Dr. Evan Dobelle 
President, Trinity College 
300 Summit Street 
Hartford, CT 06106 
32. RADM Paul Gaffhey, USN 
'Chief, Office of Naval Research 
800 N. Quincy St. 
Arlington, VA 22217-4258 
33. Mr. T. Morris Hackney 
Chairman, Citation Corporation 
2 Office Park Circle, Suite 204 
Birmingham, AL 35223 
34. Ms. Ronnie Liebowitz 
Hellring, Lindeman, Goldstein & Siegal 
One Gateway Center 
Newark, NJ 07102-5386 
35. Dr. Elisabeth Pate-Cornell 
Professor and Chair 
Stanford University 
Terman Engineering Center 
Stanford, CA 94305 
36. Prof. Carolyn Ellis Staton 
Assoc. Provost & Assoc. Vice Chancellor for 
Academic Affairs 
University of Mississippi 
Lyceum Bldg., Room 115 
University, MS 38677 
37. VADM Jerry Turtle (USN, Ret) 
Senior Vice President 
Management Technology International 
12015 Lee Jackson Hwy 
Fairfax, VA 22033-3300 
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38. Dr. William Vega 
Chancellor, Coast Community College District 
1370 Adams Ave. 
Costa Mesa, CA 92626 
39. Mr. G. Kim Wincup 
Vice President 
Science Applications Intern. Corp. 
1710 Goodridge Dr. 
MS 1-14-14 
McLean, VA 22102 
40. Professor William R. Gates 
Department of Systems Management, Code SM/ 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943 
41. Professor Xavier K. Maruyama 
Department of Physics, Code PH/ 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943 
42. Professor John P. Powers 
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 
Code EC/Po 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943 
43. Professor Richard E. Rosenthal, Chair 
Department of Operations Research, Code OR/ 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943 
44. Professor Alfred W. M. Cooper, Faculty Chairman 
Department of Physics, Code PH/Cr 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943 
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